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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
IN TH.FJ MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF DALLAS BED-
:B,ORD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN 
AS D. B. LEWIS, DECEASED. 
LUCILLE PARKER, JACK HEIDT 
and ROBERT GASTON, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
ERNEST L. LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10719 
APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF' 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a contest between executors appointed at the 
domicile and a brother of the decedent, a Utah resident, 
Pach Reeking the probate in Utah of the foreign will of 
trie decPdent and the appointment of the contesting party 
as the representative of the estate for the purpose of 
conducting ancillary proceedings in the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION TN LOWER COURT 
rn1e los1:rr Court U(lmitted the will of the decedent 
to probate as a foreign will, denied the petition of the 
2 
executors who had be011 appointed as such at the domi-
cile of the decedent and appointed the petitioning brother 
as administrator with tlw will annexed for the conduct 
of ancillary probate proceedings in the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the order appointing 
respondent brother as administrator with the will an. 
nexed of the estate of the decedent and directing the 
lower Court to enter an order appointing appellants as 
executors under the ·will for the conduct of ancillary 
proceedings in the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal here is somewhat confusing. 
It consists of tbree files, namely (a) the pleadings file, 
pages numbered 1 through 11, and 98 through 111, with 
Exhibits 1, 3 and 4 attached, here designated as "R. ": 
(b) the so-called Original File, which is the copy of the 
will and the probate thereof authenticated by the Cali· 
fornia Court, pages numbered 12 through 97, here des· 
ignated as "Of."; and ( c) the Reporter's Transcript. 
pages numbered 1 through 130, here designated as "Tr.'' 
No substantial issue of fact is involved, the questiolli 
presented are essentially issues of law. 
Dallas Bedford Levvis, herein termed the decedent 
died a resident of the State of California, on April 23 
1966, leaving an elaborate will dated December 7, 196~ 
which he had himself prepared. (Of. 13-33, Tr. 69) 
r 
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DPcrdent was a successful business man engaged 
prirnaril_v in th(• operation of the Lewis Food Company. 
'rlii~ compa11~7 pn~pares and markets pet foods under 
the well-lrnowu name of "Dr. Ross Dog aud Cat Food." 
(Of. B-3:3) Deced0nt had other property holdings in 
( 'alifornia, Trlaho, Oregon, 'rennessee and Utah. (Tr. 4) 
']'hr ndur of deeedent 's estate is in excess of $5,000,000. 
(Of. J 2, SrJ) 
The will did not name any executors as such, but 
11am0c1 appellants Lucille Parker, Jack Heidt and Robert 
Gaston to perform certain duties and enjoy certain 
po-wt-rs in connection with the administration of dece-
dent's estate and denominated these persons as "Trus-
ters." (Of. 13-33) 
On J\Iay 2, 1966, Lucille Parker filed a petition in 
the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles Coun-
ty, praying for the probate of the will, for interpreta-
tion of the same, for tlrsignation of executors thereunder, 
or in the alternative for issuance of letters of admini-
stration with the will annexed. On the following day 
RobPrt Gaston and Jack Heidt filed their petition for 
J;rol>ate of the will. (Of. 87-88) 
'I1hese petitions <:'.ame on regularly to be heard be-
fore the California Court on May 25, 1966. Respondent 
.PJm(•st L. Lewis, who is a brother of the decedent, 
)'(>(•rived notice of surh lwaring, engaged an attorney 
;md appc•ared in person aml by attorney at the hearing. 
(Of. 87-89) 
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The California Court, upon hearing on the petitio11
1 
entered an order dated May 25, 1966, that the decedent 
died testate on April 25, 1966, a resident of the State 
of California, leaving an estate therein, that the docu. 
ment dated December 7, 1965, be admitted to probate 
as the will of the decedent, that Lucille Parker, Rober1 
Gaston and Jack Heidt were named as executors under 
the will appointing said persons as executors and order. 
ing that letters testamentary be issued to them upor 
furnishing a corporate surety bond in the sum of fiYt 
million dollars. (Of. 87-89) 
On the same day, Parker, Gaston a.nd Heidt, here 
under termed ''executors'' furnished a corporate suret) 
bond in the sum of five million dollars (Of. 90) arn 
letters testamentary were issued to them on May 2fj 
1966. (Of. 96) 
The property interests of decedent in the State ~ 
Utah consist of rights with respect to some seventee 
thousand acres of mining properties in Millard an, 
Beaver Counties, Utah, together with a small pla1 < 
located thereon and miscellaneous machinery, equiJ 
ment and personal property used in connection wil ( 
the operation of the plant and mining property. (R. l ( 
The decedent acquired his interest in this pro] 1 
erty by reason of entering into a joint venture agre rJ 
ment with Thomas N. Neale and Sulphurdale Minir a 
Company, a Nevada corporation, under date of Mar1 
23, 1961. Pursuant to the agreement, the property "11'1 0 
to be operated under the joint venture name of "Sr 11 
plrnrdale Chemical Uompany.'' Decedent was the man-
agi11g joint vcnturor and was to be in charge of all 
operntionR of the joint venture. In the event of the 
death of a joint venturor, his executor or administrator 
Rhould carry on in his place antl he subject to the obli-
g-a tions of the deceased joint venturor under the agree-
ment. The interest of the decedent in the venture was 
51 %. (FJxhihit 3 to R.) 
Immediately following the death of the decedent, 
reRpondent Ernest L. Lewis was instrumental in caus-
ing the Lewis Food Company to exercise an option to 
purchas(~ from Neale and Sulphurdale Mining Com-
pany for $415,000 a 46.55% interest in the joint venture. 
Under this transaction, respondent obtained from the 
purchase price unknown to the executors, a payment of 
$24,000. (Tr. 112) 
The joint venture has never proved to be profitable. 
I11 order to keep this venture going, it was necessary 
, for the decedent or the :B..,ood Company to pour in excess 
1 of $600,000 into the venture. (Tr. 49) This was accom-
plished, prior to decedent's death, by creating an ac-
eouut into which the decedent or the Food Company 
deposited funds 'vhich were withdrawn and charged to 
the venture. Upon the death of the decedent, it was 
uecessary to continue to pour money into the venture. 
e' rrhe executors determined that this should be done by 
11 arhai1cing money from the Food Company. Under this 
r1 proee(lure there was advanced to the venture the sum 
~·; of $8,5S6 between J\ pril 28 and June 30, 1966. Included 
;1 iu lhef'e ac1nrnces wa8 salary to respondent which was 
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to be $650 per month, with an expense allowance of 
$200 per mouth, one-half of which was to come from the 
Food Company and the other half to be charged to the 
joint venture. (Tr. 3f), 4:-n 
Necessarily the only means of paymg the cost of 
maintaining the joint venture property will be to cou. 
tinually advance money for such purposes which, until 
the property is sold, must come from the Food Company. 
This Company during the pendency of the probate pro-
ceedings is under the direction and control of the exec-
utorn. The joint venture could, accordingly, be a sub-
stantial drain upon the funds of the estate. This the de-
cedent recognized and accordingly made provision in 
his will that the Utah property should be sold for casb 
or traded for listed stocks within six months, if possible. 
and if not sold by the executors within six months, the11 
the property should he sold at public auction by profes 
sional auctioneers identified in his will. (Will - page l 
Of. 13) 
Under date of .June 2, 1966, respondent Ernest L 
Lewis filed in the District Court of Millard County 
Utah, a petition for the appointment of himself as a11 
cillary administrator with the will annexed of the estat, 
of the decedent. The petition alleged that decedeu 
died leaving a will which was duly admitted to probat' 
on May 25, 1966, as hereinabove set forth. The pet! 
tioner did not present with his petition a copy of th 
will and the probate thereof duly authenticated as J'f 
quired by the provisions of Section 75-3-23, U.C..1 
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l!l:.1.'3, but alleged that such production would be made 
;ii tlw hearing 011 his petition. (R. 1-3) 
Hesporn1ent EJrncst L. Lewis was in touch with the 
n•rffes1•Htativ<~s of the estate and in close contact with 
t lH· proceediugs in California. On June 2, 1966, a con-
frrPnce was held between the executors and their coun-
sel at which grnest Le-wis appeared with his attorney, 
who mrnounced that Mr. Lewis had filed for ancillary 
lettern of administration in the State of Utah. On the 
same day, consideration was given to the appointment 
of Utah counsPl, the names of certain recommended 
uttorne)TS were obtained, and on June 5, at the meeting 
of thc1 executors, employment of Utah counsel was au-
thorized. On J unc 8, attorneys for various executors 
came to Utah and employed Messrs. Crafts and Wad-
dingham as counsel for the executors, who on June 9th 
prepared and transmitted objections to the petition of 
respondent and their own petition for the probate of 
the will of decedent as a foreign ·will and for the issuance 
to ex0cutors of letters testamentary. (Tr. 7-9) This was 
filed ou June 14, 1966. (R. 4-11) Copy of the will and 
the probate thereof <luly authenticated by the California 
C'ourt was filed in support of the executors' petition. 
(OL 12-96) 
'I11ie two petitions came on for hearing before the 
lower Court on July 29, 1966. The lower Court made 
firn1i11g-s aud condusions that: 
1. Ernest L. Lewis is a competent person 
to he named as administrator with will annexed 
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in this matter, and is in no way precluded from 
so serving. 
2. Lucille Parker, Jack Heidt and Robert 
Gaston were named in the will as ''trustees'' but 
not as executors, and hence as non-residents of 
the state of Utah are incompetent to serve here. 
3. However, it is immaterial whether they 
were named as ''trustees'' or executors in the 
will inasmuch as they did not petition this Court 
within the 30 days required by Section 75-3-4 
U.C.A. 1953. Further they did not show good 
or any cause for the delay. 
4. From the verified petition herein it ap-
pears the rental value of the real property in 
Utah approximates $47,000 per year and the 
value of the personal property approximates 
$9,000. There was no dispute as to such figures. 
5. The will was in all respects executed m 
required by law, was admitted to probate in 
California on M'ay 25, 1966 as appears from the 
exemplified copies of the will and the Court pro· 
ceedings there which have been filed in this Court 
Pursuant to said findings and conclusions, the Cour1 
ordered that the will of the decedent be admitted ti' 
probate in Utah, that Ernest L. Lewis be appointee 
administrator with the will annexed, that the objectiorn 
of Parker, Heidt and Gaston be overruled and denied 
and their pe,tition for appointment of themselves a: 
executors be denied. (R. 98-104) 
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ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
TH~ LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT APPELLANTS WERE NOT NAMED 
AS EXJi}CUTORS UNDER THE WILL OF 
rrHEl DECEDENT. 
At the threshold of this argument we are con-
fronted with the question of whether appellants are 
named executors under the will of the decedent. If they 
are not executors, they are disqualified from acting in 
these ancillary pruceedings because they are nonresi-
dents. If they are executors, their nonresidence does not 
disqualify them. In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 
Pac. 299; In re Raat's Estate, 102 Utah 482, 132 P. 2d 
136; In re Howard's Estate, 108 Utah 294, 159 P. 2d 586. 
As shown by the fore going statement of facts, the 
will of the decedent does not designate executors by 
that term. The decedent employs the term "trustees." 
This situation required judicial construction of the will 
to determine whether the persons named as trustees 
wc·re in law executors under the will. This the Cali-
fornia Court undertook to do pursuant to the petition 
of appellants. The California Court, upon a consider-
ation of the provisions of the will hereinafter further 
considered, held that appellants were named as executors 
under the will and made the order for their appoint-
nwnt. (OL 87-89) The Utah Court notwithstanding the 
judgincnt. arnl determination theretofore made by the 
(\llifornia Court at the domicile, held otherwise as 
l1i->reinahove shown. In so doing, we submit the lower 
Conrt erred. 
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(a) The Order of the California Court Ap-
pointing Appellants as Executors Is Binding 
Upon Respondent and the Lower Court. 
The Utah trial court as indicated herein admits 
the will of the decedent to probate on the record and 
order of the California Court. The lower Court, how-
ever, undertakes to fragment the order of the Cali-
fornia Court and while admitting the will to probate, 
in effect strikes down the order of the California Cour\ 
in appointing appellants as executors thereunder. ThiR 
the Utah Court may not properly do. 
As herein shown, respondent Ernest L. Lewis ap· 
peared in person and by attorney in the California pro-
ceedings in which that Court held that appellants were 
named as exeeutors under the will and ordered their 
appointment. Respondent was accordingly a party to 
such proceedings and is bound thereby. He may nol 
now bring those proceedings to the Utah Court as a 
hasiR for the admission here of the foreign will of th~ 
decedent and avoid a portion of the judgment of tha! 
Court pursuant to which appellants were appointed m 
executors under the will of the decedent. 
The foregoing controlling principle is announrec 
and fixed in this jurisdiction by the landmark case 01 
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 522, 37 L.RJ 
N.S. 368. The decision of Barrette establishes in thi: 
jurisdiction the proposition that where statutory notici 
has been given, all persons who are interested in th 
estate and in fact all the world are bound by all order 
or decrees duly entered. Not only was responde11 
11 
I1~rnPst L. I ,l'\\'i,c.; g1ve11 11oti('e of the proceedings held 
hdort• tlw California Court but he appeared and par-
ti<'ipate<l thPr<'i11. lfo is accordingly bound by those pro-
c-e0di11gs and emmot now object in ancillary proceedings 
i11 LTtnli, to tlw result obtained iu the very proceedings 
i11 \Yl1irl1 IH· participated. If respondent were dissatis-
fiC'd <with the result reached in California, his remedy 
is hy appeal in the California Courhi. In order to test 
the sonuduess of the foregoing principle one need only 
<'OHsider for a moment the havoc which would result 
from a co11trary rule. If the judgment of the California 
Court can he assailed in Utah it can be assailed in every 
other state i11 whirh the decedent held property. More-
ovC"r, if the appointment made by the lower Court were 
rwrmitted to stand, respondent might very well seek 
refuge hehiud the Utah judgment and refuse to account 
to the executors upon the ground that their appointment 
in California was void. This demonsfrates the neces-
sit~· of lrnving this question resolved at the domicile 
and if attackerl there onl~' by appeal in the courts of 
that state. He cannot in effect collaterally attack those 
proceedings by the ancillary proceedings in the State 
of Utah. The rule is stated in Bancroft, Probate Prac-
tirc, 2nd Eel., Vol. 1, Section 40, as follows: 
''Where statutory notice has been given, all 
who are interested in the estate, and, in fact, 
all the world, are hound by all orders or decrees 
dnlY entered. And surh notice, where the statute 
so .provides, may be constructive and need not 
he nehial.'' Citing nnmrrous cases including- Cali-
fornia antli<witics arn1 Barrett I'. Whitney, supra. 
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Moreover, respondent Ernest L. Lewis is bound by 
the express provisions of Section 75-3-24, U.C.A. 1953, 
as follows: 
75-3-24. Hearing and proof. - If on the 
hearing it appears upon the face of the record 
that the will has been proved, allowed and ad-
mitted to probate in any other state or territory 
of the United States, or in any foreign country, 
and that it was executed according to the law of 
the place in which the same was made, or in which 
the testator was at the time domiciled, or in con-
formity with the laws of this state, it must be 
admitted to probate and shall have the same 
force and effect as a will first admitted to pro-
bate in this state, and letters testamentary or of 
administration shall issue thereon. 
The foregoing section is considered carefully rn 
Bancroft, Probate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, under Sec-
tion 145, where the following rule is laid down: 
Under the federal constitution and statutes 
governing the effect of judgments of one state 
upon proper proof in another, probate in any 
state must be considered as conclusive upon the 
courts of any other in respect of every matter in 
which it is conclusive in the state of original 
probate. The original probate is thus conclusive 
as to personalty everywhere upon all questions 
of due execution, fraud, undue influence, an<l 
other matters affecting the validity and formal 
sufficiency of the will as the last will of the 
particular decedent, save for such right to ap· 
peal, move to set aside, or contest after probate 
as may be given by such jurisdiction. And i! 
the statute in another jurjsdirtion where the 
will is subsequently offered for -probate as a 
foreign will provides that a will made out ol 
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tl1 <' t:it ate by une not domiciled therein is as valid 
when cxeC'utcd according to the law of the place 
in which it was made or in which the testator 
was domiciled at the time as if made in conform-
ity with <lumestic law, such statute, interpreted 
in the light of the requirement of the federal 
<'onstitution that full force and effect be given 
judgmPnts from sister states, makes probate upon 
the record of probate in the other state conclu-
sive as to sufficiency of the will as a muniment 
of title to domestic realty. The fact that a foreign 
will is subject, in the jurisdiction of its original 
probate, to attack or contest and to review on 
appeal does not militate against its conclusiveness 
in the jurisdiction of ancillary probate, unless 
and until such attack or appeal is made or taken 
in the original jurisdiction. Nor does such fact 
warrant like attack or review in the ancillary 
jurisdiction. 
Specifically, the determination of the right to letters 
testamentary is conclusive upon all parties who were 
participants in and bound by the proceedings in which 
that determination was made. This rule is stated in 
Bancroft, Probate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, Section 276, 
as follows: 
The order granting letters adjudges of neces-
sity the right of the person to whom they are 
granted to such letters. 
It is aC'cordingly clear that the determination of the 
California Court on the question as to whether appel-
lants were namerl as executors under the will of the 
dececle11t and the order appointing them to this office 
is eouelusiYe upon respondent and the lower Court here. 
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(b) The Will Names Appellants as Executors. 
Assuming arguendo that the Utah Court was not 
bound by the order of the California Court appointing 
appellants as executors, and that the Utah Court could 
examine the will de uovo on this question can there be 
any serious doubt that the California Court was right 
in the determination which it made? "\Ve think not. 
It appears that three sections of the Utah Code, 
1953, a re involved here. They are respectively Sections 
74-2-2, 74-2-24 and 74-3-17, which provide as follows: 
7 4-2-2. Intention to be ascertained from 
words of will. - In case of uncertainty arising 
upon the face of a will as to the application of 
any of its provisions, the testator's intention is 
to be ascertained from the words of the will, 
taking into view the circumstances under which 
it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations. 
74-2-24. Imperfect descriptions to be cor· 
rected - Evidence admissible. - When, apply. 
ing a will, it is found that there is an imperfect 
description, or that no person or property exactly 
answers the description, mistakes and omissiom 
must he corrected, if the error appears from the 
context of the will or from extrinsic evidence: 
hut evidence of the declaratiorn; of the testator a~ 
to his intentions cannot he received. 
74-~-17. Although not named executor, one 
intended entitled to letters. - "\Vhere it appean 
bv the terms of a will that it was the intentioTI 
of the testator to commit the execution thereof 
and the administrntion of his estate to any per· 
son as executor, surh person, althoug-h not namrd 
exerutor, is entitlrd to 10tters testamentary ir 
15 
the same manner as if he had been named execu-
tor. 
Of the foregoing Sections, 7 4-3-17 is controlling 
ht>rc. rrhis Section is substantially the same as Section 
40~ of tlie California Code. Historically, of course, our 
prohate code was largely taken from that of California, 
a)l(1 the construction of the California Courts should 
br· given considerable weight in construing the Utah 
Code provisions. In re Raat 's Estate, supra. The ques-
tion here is simply whether the named persons are 
('harged with the performance of the duties of execu-
tors. That they are designated "trustees" is not mater-
ial. 
The duties of an executor are essentially to marshal 
the assets of the estate, pay the debts of the decedent 
arnl the costs of administration and to sell such property 
as may be necessary for these purposes, and then to 
distribute the remainder of the estate to the parties 
entitled thereto under the will. In a large estate such 
as this, the payment of estate and inheritance taxes is 
one of the most important duties of the executor, and 
often necessitates the sale of property to do so. The 
fnnctions of a trustee arise when the probate proceed-
i11gs as such have been completed. It is quite common 
in large estates today to name the same person or per-
sons as executors and trustees under the will, the reason 
h0ing that thereby a continuity of control over the 
estate property can he achieved. The persons so named 
\\~onhl accordingly perform their duties as executors 
until tlwse duties were discharged and thereafter per-
Hi 
form their duties as trustees. The essential inquiry 
should accordingly be directed to an examination of 
the duties imposed upon appellants. If the appellants 
are required to perform the duties of executors under 
the will, they are named as such regardless of the term 
employed to identify them. 
An examination of certain of the provisions of the 
will quite clearly demonstrate that the duties required 
to be performed by appellants here were duties of exec-
utors. This is made clear by the following provisions: 
Under Section Thirty-First at Page 14 of the will 
(Of. 25) the following duties are imposed upon the 
parties named : 
For the purpose of carrying out the term 
of this Will I shall appoint as trustees: my 
niece, LUCILLE CASSO-PARKER as heaJ 
trustee, ROBERT GASTON as attorney ano 
co-trustee, and JACK HEIDT now of the Unio1 
Bank of Los Angeles, as the third trustee, ano 
CAROLYN M. ALEXANDER as an alternatiw 
trustee. However, LUCILLE CASSO-PARKER 
would have the right to replace ROBERT GAS 
TON with or without cause, and hire any attorne; 
that she secs fit and also to appoint any addi 
tional co-trustee in case one of the others resignel 
for anv reason. In the case of the death o: 
LUCII~LF, CASSO-PARKER, then CAROLY~ 
M. ALEXANDER shall assume the responsibil 
ities of trustee. In the case of the death or resir 
nation of LUCILLE <:ASSO-P ARKER or CAF 
OLYN l\L ALEXANDER, then JACK HEID~ 
wm assume the trusteeship. 
)' 
f 
r 
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1'hc usual language for the appointment of an exec-
utor is substantially as follows: "I nominate and ap-
point as exf'cutor hereunder (the nanied person.)" The 
J:wguage hereinabove employed is of the same import. 
'I'lw duty of carrying out the terms of the will is cer-
tainly that of an executor. It may also be the duty of 
a trustee if trusts are created but it is nonetheless the 
duty of an executor. 
The will provides for the sale of various parcels 
of property under Paragraph First, Page 1 (Of. 13) 
thereof as follows: 
FIRST: Inasmuch as my mineral and min-
ing holdings are substantial and somewhat com-
plicated, and even though they may have con-
siderable value, I would instruct my trustee or 
trustees to attempt to sell them for cash or trade 
for listed stocks at a reasonable or fair value, 
if possible, within six (6) months. If they were 
unable to find a satisfactory buyer for those 
mineral properties within the six (6) month per-
iod, then I would instruct that such trustee or 
trustees employ the Milton J. Wershow Company 
or the David Weiss Company to offer the min-
eral property holdin:gs, namely Sulpherdale 
Chemical Company, my interests in Nuclear Fuel 
and Rare Metals for public auction, and sell them 
at the best possible price that they would bring at 
public auction; and that the auctioneer be in-
structed to publicize the sale to reach the great-
est number of potential buyers. If the Milton 
.T. \V rrshow Company or the David Weiss Com-
pany are no longer in business, a similar capable 
or~rnnization mav be used for this purpose. 
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rrhe sale> of these assets is quite clearly the functio11 
of an executor especially where the sale is to be made 
immediately. 
The will in Paragraph Second, Page 2 (Of. unnum. 
bered followi11g 1:q provides for the sale of property 
for the purpose of payment of inheritance taxes as fo]. 
lows: 
. . . If the total business could not be sold 
at the minimum of three (3) times book value. 
thfm I instruct my trustee or trustees to sell al 
fair market value the properties owned by 
LEvVIS FOOD COMPANY located at 817 Ea~t 
18th Stred, and Charlotte and Soto Streets to 
Chieago Street which is not now being used i1~ 
the business, both properties in the City ant! 
County of Los Angeles, and other assets men 
tioned, other tlrnn the LE"\VIS FOOD COMP ANT 
itself and its propert~T located at 6700 Cherr; 
A venue, North Long Beach, and that the revr 
irn<> receiYed from these sales be used to pa: 
the inheritance tax on my estate, if sufficient 
If it is not sufficient and if possible, a long-tern 
lo::rn should he ohtainecl on other assets of LEWn 
FOOD COMP ANY that would liquidate the bnl 
ance of the> inheritance tax, ... 
One of the most arduous duties of an executor i1 
an estate of the size involved here will he the payme1 
of Federal FJsta te Taxes. The performance of this clnl 
is imprn;;ed by la\\· upon the executor. He cannot coD' 
plete hi8 probate duties or gain his discharge until snc 
taxes are pai(l. 
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Tli;· ,,·ill, Paragraph Sixth, Page 5 (Of. 16) makes 
pnl\-i siom; for partial distribution: 
... Partial distribution, either of the divi-
(1rrnls of the operation or the sale of its assets 
over and above the requirements for inheritance 
tax may be made at the discretion of the trustee 
or trustees so long as ample and sufficient funds 
are rrtained to maintain the business operation 
of the LFJ\VIS FOOD COMP ANY .... 
Distribution whether partial or complete is a func-
tion of the exerutor. 
Numerous trusts are created under the ·will of the 
de<'edent. In none of these are all the executors named 
as trustees. In each of these trusts Security First Na-
tional Bank is IJamed as trustee, with an individual 
(usually Lucille Parker) or individuals, as co-trustees. 
(Of. 13-3:3) There is accordingly a separation of func-
tiorn; and perso1111el between appellants as executors 
and the parties charged with the duties of administering 
the trusts. 
The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates the 
prnposition that appellants were named as executors, 
1hat the California Court was correct in its construc-
tion and the lower Court erred. 
( c) Property Involved Here Is Personalty 
"\Vhich Is Controlled by the Law of the Domicile. 
The foregoing argument under this Point I should 
dispose of the question of whether appellants were 
i1mn0l1 as cxeeutors under the will. This question is one 
20 
which of 11eerssit!· must he determined at the inceptio1 
of prohatr yH·occedings. The ownership of or distrihu 
tion of property is not invoh·ed in that determi11atio11 
The ge1wral rule is, however, that the validity and iu 
terpretation of wills with respect to realty is governer 
by the law of the situs and ·with respect to persona 
property by the law of the domicile. 
As herrin show11 Paragraph First of the will rt 
quires the executors immediately to sell the Utah prop 
ert!r or to trade the same for listed stocks, in othe 
words to convert the same into personal property. 
Section 74-2-22 of U.C.A., 1953 dealing with th 
question of when realty is deemed personalty provide 
as follows: 
7 4-2-22. When realty deemed personalty. -
When a "ill directs the conversion of real pror 
erty into money, such property and all its pri 
ceeds must be deemed personal property fror 
the time of the testator's death. 
Section 74-~-21, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth the aho1 
stated rule with respect to construction, as follows: 
7 4-3-21. When law of locus and law of dom 
cile governs. - Except as otherwise provide 
the \'alidity and interpretation of wills are go 
erned, when relating to real property within tl: 
statr, by the law of this state; when relating 
personal property, b~r the la"- of the testato1 
domicile. 
If the Utah property is regarded as realty it is <'1' 
vPrted into pNsonalty by the terms of the will and urnl 
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tlH' foregoillg Sertion 74-3-21 the will with respect to 
:·rneh property is controlled by the law of the domicile. 
-'\ s hereinabove shown, the rights of decedent in 
t l1« 1 i tali property are basically controlled by the joint 
\ 1·11turr agreement. Generally speaking, joint ventures 
<11td partnerships are governed by the same rules of 
law. F'orhes c. Butler, 66 Utah 373, 242 Pac. 950. Usu-
ally, in the case of the dissolution of a partnership, the 
pro\'isions of Section 75-11-9 of our probate code apply, 
pursuant to which the surviving partner has the obliga-
t i1111 aud duty to wind up the affairs of the partnership 
aml uecow1t to the representative of the deceased part-
uer. Respondent does not qualify for such duties be-
c;mHe he asserts and the lower Court found that he had 
transferred his interest in the venture to his wife. 
However, the matter of the operation and control of the 
joint venture in the event of the death of a joint venturor 
is expressly controlled by the provisions of paragraph 
J .) tlwreof to the effect that: 
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of 
and shall be binding upon the respective suc-
cessors and heirs and assigns of the parties 
hereto. In this respect, in the event of the death 
of an individual joint venturor his executor or 
administrator shall carry on in his place and 
shall be subject to the obligations of said deceased 
joint venturor under this contract until distribu-
tion anrl upon distribution the heir of said joint 
v0nturor or the purchaser of the joint venturor's 
iuten•Ht shall be subject to all of the terms and 
eondiiions of this agreement. 
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(Ex. :J, page ii, H.) 
Control of the joint venture is placed in the ha11d.· 
of the decedent urnlrr paragraph G of the joint ventun 
agrePmeut \\ 11id1 provides as follows: 
Contributions and duties of Lewis. Lewi, 
shall he t11P managing joint venturor and wil 
he in charge of all operations of the joint venturi 
and shall utilize sound business principles in th, 
management and operation of said joint venturi· 
(Ex. 3, Page 3, R.) 
Considering tlwse statutes, the provisions of tJr, 
will and the joint 'l'entnre agreement, it is manifest tha 
the control of tlie joint venture was intended to he i· 
D. B. Ll'Wis and his executors. As herein shown, tl1 
Food Company acquired an additional 46.55% intere· 
in the joint venture immediately after the death of tl1 
decedent. Inasmuch as the joint nmture had no fund 
to operate and "'HS dependent in order to keep goin 
upon funds heing supplied from outside sources, sm 
proprrt~, should be controlled h~, the executors namf' 
at the domicil<'. If thr matter were fragmented and i 
the ancillary proeePdings an administrator with the wi 
() 
annexed wen' able to rontrol this property and mal <· 
essential dPcisi011s i11 eonnection therewith, the unifi1 t I 
administration which is so essential in an estate of tl1 
size ano romplexit~, "'ould he lost and substantial det1 
ti 
r:l'lw foregoi11g simply further demonstrates the 1 °1 
scntial proposition that ihc appointment of the cxecu! cc 
at the domieilP must h0 hi11<li11g upon the Utah Court. 11 ( 
23 
POINT II. 
'I11IE LOWJ1JR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
rrIUJ l!TAII PErrITION OF THE EXECU-
rrORS UPON rrHE ASSERTED GROUND 
rrnArr rrHE SAME WAS NOT FILED WITH-
1N rrIIIRTY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF 
rr HE lH~ATH OF THE DECEDENT. 
As Jiereinabove shown, the Court concluded that 
it was immaterial whether the appellants were named 
as trustees or Pxecutors inasmuch as they did not peti-
t io11 the Court \\'ithin the thirty days required by Section 
/:J-:~A, U .C.A., 195:1. 
In so l1oldi11g, we believe the Court was clearly in 
Pl'J'Or. 
(a) The California Petition Was Timely 
Filed. 
Decc><lent died on Monday, April 25, 1966. On the 
following :Monday, May 2, 1966, the petition of appel-
lant; Lucille Parker, was filed in the Superior Court 
of Los A ngC'les County and on the following day the 
pdition of tl1e other two appellants. No contention is 
or ea11 he mad<> that the executors did not proceed in 
compliance with California law in the timely filing of 
their pc>titions. 
rriw must cursory reading of this will demonstrates 
that the instrument is a classic example of the attempt 
of a WPfl lil1y hm;i11ess man to prepare an elaborate and 
er 1 rnplieatt~d will without the aid of legal counsel. As 
lH•11·i n :-;Jiow11, tl1e decedent did not use the term "exec-
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uton;'' aml throughout the will employed the tern 
"trustees." At the outf.;Pt it was necessary for the ap 
pellants to have a legal determination made of thi 
representative capacity in which they were authorizer 
to act. Until that dPtennination was made, they bar 
no power to act aR executors in California or any othe 
jurisdiction. Upou a hearing of the petition, the Cali 
fornia Court held on May 25, 1966, that petitioners wer. 
named as executors under the will. On the very sam 
day they furnished a corporate surety bond for fo 
million dollars and signed their oaths as executor, 
which was filed and letters testamentary issued on tL 
following day. This was clearly most expeditious co; 
duct. "\Vi thin the following week the respondent r1 
turned to Utah, engaged counsel and filed his petitioi 
HP asserts and the lower Court holds, that the exec1 
tors were required under Utah law to file their petitior 
for ancillary proceedings in Utah on or prior to Ma 
25, 1966. 
(b) The Utah Petition Could Not Be Fih 
Until the "'\Vill Was Admitted in California. 
The provisions of Section 75-3-4, U.C.A., 1953, r 
late to the duty of an executor in control of a will· 
initiate proceedings at the domicile of the decedent. : 
we have heretofore observed, the decedent died a re• 
dent of California. Tn that jurisdiction the proceedin 
were rommenced with the utmost expedition. The pi 
ccedings in Utah involve the admission of a foreign" 
to probate. "\Ve must accordingly look to our statute 
ascertain the requirements of our law in this respe 
which requires an examination of Sections 75_3.: 
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11 /;->-::-~:1 and 75-8-24, U.C.A. 1953. Section 75-3-24 has 
p hrret ofore hPen considered. The provisions of the other 
hi two sect i 0118 a re respectively as follows : 
er 
ar 
75-3-22. Foreign wills - May be admitted 
to probate. - Wills duly proved and allowed in 
auy other state or any territory of the United 
r::Hates, or in any foreign country or state, may be 
allowed and recorded in any county in which the 
testator shall have left any estate. 
75-3-~3. Proceedings on production. - When 
a copy of such will and the probate thereof, duly 
l" authenticated, shall be produced by any person 
interested in the will with a petition for letters, 
the same must be filed, and the court or clerk 
must appoint a time for the hearing, of which 
notice must be given as hereinbefore provided 
for an original petition for the probate of a will. 
Tl1e language of Section 75-3-23 is at the outset 
rr controlling. From this section it is seen that ancillary 
a proceedingH for admission of a foreign will require as a 
C'ondition precedent, the proof of the will in another 
jurisdiction. The party seeking to conduct ancillary pro-
eerdingR under a foreign will cannot produce the orig-
r inal will beeause this is lodged with the Court at the 
domi('ile. He must await the outcome of proceedings 
at the <lomicile hefore he can initiate the ancillary pro-
" e0edings because he is required to produce the copy of 
1 the will and the probate thereof duly authenticated. 
1 T!rn1cr the facts here, the executors could not have filed 
r tlw rwtition iu Utah until the 26th of May, the day let-
ters w<>n' i:;;~ued to them. This under the ruling of the 
1 lower C011rt would he too late under the provisions of 
To further clcmonstrate the rrror of the Court' 
ruling, suppose that a rontest had arisen in Californi: 
011 the admission of the will or the naming of the exe( 
utors and this hntl tn ken a month to resolve. Durin 
this period C'Ompliance could not have been had wit: 
Section 7f:i-3-23 becaust> the required record could nv 
be producrd. Could it seriously be contended that undf 
such circumstanrrs Section 75-3-4 foreclosed the rig), 
of the executors to conduct ancillary proceedings i 
Utah. 
(c) The Utah Petition Was Timely Filed. 
1t is ac<'.ordingly necessary to construe the pror 
sions of Section 7;}-3-4 in relation to the sections dealin 
with foreign wills. The proper construction of all the! , 
sectiorn; is, we suhmit, that the thirty-day period pr 
scribed under Sedion 75-3-4 does not begin to run 1 
tl1e ease of a \Vill being admitted in a foreig-n jurisdi 1 
tiou nntil thr orclL'l' has been enterc>d for the admissir 
of that will to probate, and the naming of an execut 
under tlw will. '\Vhe11 that has occurred, the penr 
named as executor is in a position to proceed in cor 
pliance with the foreign will statutes. Until that orrl 
has heen issued the hands of the executor are tied a 
llP cannot compl:· with the pro\'isions of Section 75-3-: 
rrhis thr lower < 'ourt faikd to recognize. Under ti 
co11structiou the executors in filing their petition "; t 
the Utah Court on .June 14, 1966, complied \\Tith i '' 
s 
theY w1 rPquirenwnts of R0dion 75-~-4 because 
within the thirty-da~' pNiod following the 
the California ord"r of Ma:T 25, 1966. 
. f 
issuance 
No lianlship ean result from the foregoing con-
siructi011 of Uwse statutes. If any necessity arose for 
in:1mPdiate prnccedi11gs iu any estate in ancillary pro-
<'PC(lings in lJ tab, the assets can be protected under 
tC>mponu·y atlministration. 
No U tab dceision is contrary to the foregoing. In 
1 n: Luce's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 Pac. 299, is not in 
1 point here. Iu that case decedent Flora B. Love died 
a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving a small 
estate in this jurisdiction. This was the place of her 
residencP and the situs of domiciliary proceedings. Ac-
1' cordingly, proceedings in her estate were necessarily 
n commenced here. The executor was not under the nec-
11 essity of first having the will admitted in a foreign jur-
r, isclidion and then conducting ancillary proceedings in 
! Utah in compliance with our statute relating to the ad-
li mif-:sion of foreign wills. Accordingly, Section 75-3-4 
,i11 applies aml the case was properly decided. 
'SI 
or 
1·<l 
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POINT III. 
EVF1N IF sgcTION 75-3-4 WERE APPLIC-
ABLE, GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAY WAS 
RH OWN. 
, thP 
W: 
Assuming arguendo that the executors were under 
m1c0ssity of filing their petition in the Utah Court 
, within thirty days after decedent's death, they have 
I 
shown good cause for delay. The executors were con-w1 ·· · 
frnnte1l wilh the administration of a very large and 
'€ 
· complieah1d <~stah•. The principal asset of the estate 
'' c1:-c a \'<'!',\' profitable business in which the decedent 
was engaged in the packaging and sale of pet food 
This business and the conduct thereof required Yer 
important and serious considerations on the part 1 
the executors. l\foreover, there were properties locatf 
in Oregon, Trlaho, Tennessee and Utah ''rhich requin 
consideration and attention. (Tr. 68-77) With respe. 
to the property locatrd in Utah, this was under tl 
local management of respondent, the brother of dee 
dent. He was deriving a salary from the local manag· 
ment of this property and charged with the duty of i· 
care, yet the executors were under the necessity ai 
are now under the necessity of continually advanci1 
money for the preservation and operation of the Utr 
property. Moreover, at the instigation of the respo11i 
ent, Ernest L. Lewis, the Food Company immedia!t 
follo,•;ring the death of decedent was induced to pay o 
$415,000 in purchase of the Neale and Sulphurda1e Mi 
ing Compan~' interests in the Utah venture. (Tr. 32-J 
The <>ntire period from the date of death of t 
decedent until the filing of the application in Utah 11 
less than two months. There is no intimation here tl: 
the Utah property was in any manner prejudiced 
impaired by this delay. The great urgency with resp1 
to the affairs of the decedent was at the domicile 
the decedent. There the most valuable asset, name 
the Food Company, was located, and there must 
generated the money with which to hold together! 
property of the estate including the property of 1 
joint venture. Had those affairs been neglected to· 
detriment of the estate, the damage "-ould have h 
incalculable. 
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cl The decedent appears not to have reposed confi-
,1 (knee in reHpondent, Ernest L. Lewis. Nothing was left 
tu Ji im di redly under the will. A trust was created for 
le Ernest L. Lewis, his wife and his son, but no responsi-
:f bility whatever was placed in the hands of Ernest in 
Cornie ct ion with the administration of the estate. The e: 
tl full responsibility for the affairs of the estate is lodged 
~ c '
ll: 
ill the executors. 
This is a good example of the prejudice and uncer-
tainty which would arise from depriving an estate of 
unified control. Here the executors were under the 
11 
necessity of continually pouring money into the prop-
b 
erty for the purpose of its preservation. The control 
111 
of 1 he property should of necessity be lodged with the 
same persons who are responsible for the expenditure 
0 
of the funds necessary for its operation and preservation. 
rrhe rule is well settled in Utah that upon a timely 
application the Court has no discretion but to appoint 
11 
a qualified executor. In re Love's Estate, supra, p. 353. 
)< 
N()r should the Court set aside the nomination of a 
testator except upon compelling reasons, none of which 
arP present here. The peculiar facts in this case and 
the necessity for unified control over the Utah property 
compel the appointment of the executors named by the 
dceeuent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The order of the Court denying the petition of ti 
executors should be reversed and the case remanded 1 
the lower Conrt with direction to grant the petition 1 
the executors and for the entry of an order appointit 
them as executors for the conduct of ancillary proba1 
proceedings in this jurisdiction. 
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